1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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4	LAMONT MARCELLE WALKER,)	3:11-cv-00080-LRH-VPC	
5	Plaintiff,	3.11-cv-00000-Lixii- v1 C	
6	v.)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
7	ROMEO ARANAS, et al.,	OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
8	Defendants.	June 19, 2012	
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11	This Report and Recommendation is made to Larry R. Hicks, United States District Judge		
12	The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B		
13	and LR IB 1-4. Before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment (#26). Plaintiff die		
14	not oppose and defendant did not file a reply. The court has thoroughly reviewed the record an		
15	recommends that defendant's motion for summary judgment (#26) be granted.		
16	I. HISTORY & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND		
17	Plaintiff Lamont Marcelle Walker ("plaintiff") is a pro se litigant who was incarcerated a		
18	Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC") in the custody of the Nevada Department o		
19	Corrections ("NDOC") (#6). Plaintiff brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging		
20	deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights		
21	<i>Id</i> . The facts that give rise to plaintiff's complaint occurred while he was incarcerated at Souther		
22	Desert Correctional Center ("SDCC"). Id. Plaintiff names SDCC Dr. Romeo Aranas, Warden Bria		
23	Williams, NDOC Medical Director Robert Bannister, NDOC Medical Review Group, and Nevad		
24	State Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto as defendants. <i>Id</i> . In his request for relief, plainting		
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	Refers to the court's docket number	er. The court granted defendant's motion for leave to file	

Refers to the court's docket number. The court granted defendant's motion for leave to file exhibits under seal and the exhibits have been filed accordingly (#32 (sealed)).

seeks monetary compensatory damages and injunctive relief.² Plaintiff's remaining claim after screening is his Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against Dr. Aranas (#5).³ Defendant Aranas ("defendant") moves for summary judgment (#26).

Plaintiff claims the following: from January 2007 through September 2010, he repeatedly sought treatment for a tumor on his head (#6, p. 3). The tumor continued to grow and caused increasing pain including "headaches, possible symptoms of [a] brain tumor." *Id.* Defendant evaluated the mass, and told plaintiff that it may be a "fatty tumor." *Id.* at 4. Defendant further stated he would not recommend surgery on the tumor to the Medical Review Group, because surgery was unnecessary and cosmetic. *Id.* Plaintiff alleges that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

The court now recounts the relevant treatment plaintiff received from January 2007 to August 2011, while plaintiff was incarcerated at SDCC. On January 22, 2008, plaintiff had a physical examination at SDCC, where it was determined that plaintiff had a lipoma, measuring five centimeters by six centimeters over the left lobe of the brain (#32-2, Ex. 2, p. 0002 (sealed)). On January 4, 2009, plaintiff sent a medical kite to NDOC staff requesting that his "cyst" be drained because it was "getting bigger and bigger" (#32-6, Ex. 6, p. 0027 (sealed)). In response, defendant examined plaintiff on January 16, 2009 (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0046 (sealed)). Defendant determined that the mass on plaintiff's head was lipoma, and recommended that plaintiff "leave it alone for now." *Id*.

From May 2009 through June 2009, plaintiff sent medical kites to NDOC requesting treatment for migraine headaches for which he was seen and given medication by both defendant and

[&]quot;When an inmate is released from prison or is transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot." *Dilley v. Gunn,* 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court dismissed all claims against defendants Williams, Bannister, NDOC Medical Review Board, and Masto (#5).

[&]quot;A lipoma is a benign tumor composed chiefly of fat cells." *Lomax v. Canalas*, 2009 WL 5199395, 2, n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Stedman's Medical Dictionary* (6th Ed. 1995); *see also* http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/lipoma.

Dr. Sanchez (#32-6, Ex. 6, pp. 0023-0024 (sealed)); (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0045 (sealed)).

On August 21, 2009, defendant examined plaintiff after plaintiff complained about the mass on his head (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0045 (*sealed*)). Defendant again determined that plaintiff's mass was probably lipoma, and planned to leave it alone. *Id.* On January 31, 2010, plaintiff sent a medical kite to NDOC staff requesting to see a specialist regarding the "cyst that's constantly growing on the back of [plaintiff's] head" (#32-5, Ex. 5, p. 0020 (*sealed*)). Plaintiff further stated in the kite that "[i]t's not a fatty tumor, tumors are solid and hard, this is soft and movable." *Id.* Dr. Sanchez evaluated plaintiff on February 16, 2010, and determined that the mass was "lipoma/cyst-scalp" (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0040 (*sealed*)).

On February 23, 2010, plaintiff sent a medical kite to NDOC requesting "to see a specialist concerning this cyst knot on my head... and I am still waiting to see a neurologist, I have massive headaches and migraines constantly. [Plaintiff] need[s] help" (#32-4, Ex. 4, p. 0017 (sealed)). Defendant examined plaintiff on March 12, 2010 (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0039 (sealed)). In defendant's notes from the visit, defendant indicated that the mass was probably lipoma, and that the Utilization Review Committee ("URC") would not approve a referral for removal of the mass. *Id.* Nevertheless, defendant referred the matter for possible surgery on March 22, 2010, and the URC denied the request on March 23, 2010 (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0055 (sealed)). Dr. Sanchez notified plaintiff of the URC's decision during a medical visit on May 12, 2010 (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0038 (sealed)).

On June 20, 2010, plaintiff sent a medical kite to NDOC stating "[m]y request to see a specialist concerning these massive headaches and migraines that I be [sic] having and also this large golf ball size knot on the back of my head that be [sic] causing these pains" (#32-4, Ex. 4, p. 0012 (sealed)). Dr. Sanchez examined plaintiff on July 13, 2010, and prescribed migraine medication. *Id.* Dr. Sanchez did not indicate that the mass on the back of plaintiff's head had any causal connection to the migraines plaintiff had been experiencing. *Id.*

On October 11, 2010, Dr. Sanchez requested that the URC approve an outside surgical evaluation (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0053 (*sealed*)). The URC approved the request and Dr. Walker examined plaintiff on November 8, 2010 (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0046 (*sealed*)). Later that day, Dr.

Timothy King, an outside medical consultant, also examined plaintiff, determined that the mass on the back of the plaintiff's head was lipoma, and recommended excision (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0053 (*sealed*)). Upon reviewing this recommendation, Dr. Gedney, an NDOC physician, noted that removal of lipoma was an elective procedure, and that plaintiff could return if interested in a revaluation. *Id.* Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated after August 1, 2011 when his sentence expired (#26-1, Ex. 1, pp. 0061-0062).

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on February 29, 2012 (#26). Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff failed to show that defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. *Id* at 11. Furthermore, defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is mooted by his release from prison. *Id.* at 17, 18. In support of his argument, defendant attaches NDOC medical records, plaintiff's progress notes, medical kites, physicians' orders, and URC requests (#32, p. 2 (*sealed*)).⁵

On March 1, 2012, the court issued its standard order pursuant to *Klingele v. Eikenberry*, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), informing plaintiff of his rights and responsibilities in responding to dispositive motions (#27). The court *sua sponte* granted plaintiff an extension of time until April 20, 2012 (#30). To date, plaintiff has failed to file an opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment and has failed to request additional time in which to do so. Local Rule 7-2 states that, "the failure of an opposing party to file points and authorities in response to any motion shall constitute a consent to the granting of the motion." Notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to oppose, the court reviews defendant's arguments in his motion for summary judgment.

The court notes that the plaintiff is proceeding in *pro se*. "In civil rights cases where plaintiffs are proceeding in *pro se*, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt." *Karim-panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep 't*, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir1988); *see also Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

Defendant submits NDOC Health Information Director Karen Walsh's declaration authenticating Exhibits 2-10 (#32-1, pp. 1-8 (*sealed*)). Ms. Walsh's declaration also summarizes plaintiff's medical records and reports. *Id*.

II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Discussion

1. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment allows courts to avoid unnecessary trials where no material factual disputes exist. *Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). The court grants summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view all evidence and any inferences arising from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Bagdadi v. Nazar*, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has noted:

[W]e must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment should not be granted. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and submitting evidence which demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the party opposing the motion may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there exists a genuine issue for trial. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

B. Analysis - Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care arises under the Eighth Amendment. The

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. *Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To prevail on an action alleging cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff's case must satisfy an objective standard – that the deprivation was serious enough to amount to cruel and unusual punishment, and a subjective standard – deliberate indifference. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); *see also Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 297-304 (1991). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he responds with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical need. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834.

The objective requirement of a "serious medical need" is met if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). In the Ninth Circuit, serious medical needs include "the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects the individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain." Lopez v. Smith 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, plaintiff fails to establish that the lipoma/cyst on the back of his head constitutes a serious medical need. Plaintiff merely assumed that he had a malignant tumor rather than lipoma (#6, p. 3). Additionally, plaintiff associated the pain from his migraines with the lipoma/cyst, however, no such connection is established in the medical record. The medical record gives no indication that the lipoma on plaintiff's head constituted a serious medical need, nor does it indicate that the lipoma continued to grow as plaintiff claimed (#32-8, Ex. 8, pp. 0046, 0045, 0039 (sealed)). In fact, the medical record indicates that the lipoma/cyst decreased in size (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0053 (sealed)). Plaintiff also fails to show that failure to remove the lipoma/cyst resulted in further significant injury or any unnecessary infliction of pain.

Along with showing a serious medical need, plaintiff must show defendant acted with deliberate indifference towards such medical need. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834. The standard for deliberate indifference in the Ninth Circuit is that it must be substantial. Mere indifference, negligence or medical malpractice will not suffice. *Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories*, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980), citing *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 105-106. To prove deliberate indifference, plaintiff

must show that prison staff denied, delayed or intentionally interfered with medical treatment or that the way prison staff provided medical care indicates deliberate indifference, and that plaintiff sustained damages as a result of such conduct. *Hutchinson v. United States*, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988).

Even if plaintiff's lipoma/cyst was a serious medical need, defendant did not act with deliberate indifference towards plaintiff's need. In response to nine medical kites seeking medical attention while at SDCC, plaintiff received medical treatment eleven times (#32-8, Ex. 8, pp. 0046, 0045, 0044, 0040, 0039, 0038 (sealed)); (#32-7, Ex. 7, p. 0035 (sealed)). In each medical visit, medical staff determined that the mass on plaintiff's head was a lipoma/cyst. In addition to the eleven visits, defendant also requested the URC allow an outside surgical consultation for plaintiff's lipoma/cyst and the URC denied the request (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0055 (sealed)). Dr. Sanchez also requested an outside surgical consultation which was granted (#32-10, Ex. 10, p. 0053 (sealed)). Dr. King, an outside consultant, opined that the mass on plaintiff's head was lipoma and recommended excision. *Id.* After assessing Dr. King's diagnosis, Dr. Gedney determined surgery was not warranted because the removal of a lipoma is an elective procedure. *Id.*

Plaintiff received treatment for his migraines even though the record shows no relation between the lipoma/cyst and the migraines.⁶ Plaintiff stated that the prescribed migraine medication alleviated pain (#32-8, Ex. 8, p. 0044 (*sealed*)). The medical records indicate defendant and other NDOC staff were responsive to plaintiff's medical concerns. Though plaintiff continued to disagree with NDOC medical staff over the diagnosis and treatment of the lipoma/cyst, this merely amounts to a difference of medical opinion. Prison staff does not violate the Eighth Amendment because their medical opinions and assessments conflict with the opinion of the patient inmate. *Franklin v. Oregon*, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Even if a disagreement over a diagnosis is the result of negligence on behalf of prison staff, such negligence would still be insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. *Wood v. Housewright*, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th

Plaintiff associated the pain from his migraines with the lipoma/cyst. Defendant treated the plaintiff's pain. However, the medical records do not show any causal connection between the lipoma/cyst and the migraines.

Cir. 1990). The court finds no evidence that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical need. Rather, the evidence shows that defendant was responsive to plaintiff's medical requests, and treated the lipoma/cyst accordingly. Specifically, the records show that NDOC medical staff and outside physicians examined or treated plaintiff thirteen times in regard to the lipoma/cyst while he was incarcerated at SDCC (#32 (sealed)). Therefore, he fails to show that defendant is liable for medical deliberate indifference because plaintiff did not receive surgery. Plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment simply by relying on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff fails to show that his medical need was serious and presents no evidence of defendant's alleged indifference towards his medical needs. As a result, summary judgment should be granted. 8

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the following and for good cause appearing, the court concludes that defendant met his burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. As such, the court recommends that defendant's motion for summary judgment (#26) be **GRANTED** as to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against defendant Dr. Aranas.

The parties are advised:

- 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this report and recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation" and should be accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court.
- 2. This report and recommendation is not an appealable order and any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.

Additionally, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant is responsible for any decisions made by the URC regarding the possible removal of the lipoma/cyst (#6, p. 3).

Because the court recommends granting summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the court does not reach the issue of qualified immunity.

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2	IV. RECOMMENDATION	
3	IT IS THEREFORE RECOMM	ENDED that defendant's motion for summary judgment
4	(#26) be GRANTED.	
5	DATED : June 19, 2012.	$2 \sqrt{\rho} \sqrt{\rho}$
6		Valuie P. Cooke
7		UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8		UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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